Ever since it appeared on the cultural scene, the Enlightenment has had its passionate critics. Philosophers as well as politicians have criticized its rationalism, its individualism, its cosmopolitanism, its faith in science and technology, its humanism, and its lack of respect for established traditions. Some have criticized individual aspects of it, others have condemned it in its entirety. At times Enlightenment thinking was all but eclipsed, as during the later part of the period of literary Romanticism, while at other times it re-surfaced with renewed vigor. In varying ways it has had a challenged and challenging presence in Western thought to this day. In recent decades Enlightenment thinking has been the target of critical endeavors once more. This time it is its individualism and cosmopolitanism that have come under persistent attack from various quarters, together with its attempt to find and formulate universally valid norms and values. Anti-Enlightenment initiatives have surfaced inside the United States as well as worldwide. They are often launched in the name of 'multiculturalism,' 'ethnic identity,' the supposed importance of 'roots,' and the general importance of 'diff6rence' as opposed to' people's common humanity. With respect to social integration, advocates of ethnic separateness prefer cultural and racial 'salad bowls' to the traditional American 'melting pot.' An issue is the Enlightenment idea that ideally every individual should not only have the right, but even the obligation to determine for himself or herself who he or she wants to be, what sort of life he or she wants to live, or with whom he or she wants to associate more closely. An individual, in other words, should not be obliged by any group to adhere to 'his' or 'her' religion, ethnicity, race, or social tradition, but be allowed and encouraged to make personal choices in all these regards-in effect be entirely free of any such particularistic determinations, if that seems best to the person in question. Essentially individuals are not seen by Enlightenment thinkers as members of particular groups, but as 'citizens of the world,' as unencumbered inhabitants of a polity that is governed by laws that in principle are valid for all human beings. People will, of course, be born into specific communities that may be distinguished from each other by various racial or cultural traits. But these distinguishing traits are not particularly important, according to Enlightenment thinking—not nearly as important as that which all human beings have in common, namely reason. While Enlightenment theoreticians will acknowledge or even welcome variety among human beings, they are far more serious about what potentially unites them, and about what should accrue to them on account of their common humanity. If in most societies—often after long and costly battles—laws have been passed which prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, creed, gender, or national origin, then an important Enlightenment principle has been realized—the principle that every individual is first a human being, and only secondarily a member of particular groups. And while recognition of one's common humanity may not necessarily be in conflict with being a member of any particular group, the principle demands that if there is a conflict, then people's common humanity takes precedence over any particularity. What is important, in other words, is not that I am Christian, Black, or Sioux, but that I am a human being, and that as such I have certain basic rights—the right of self-determination most prominently among them. Any attempt on the part of any group to declare their particularity as primary vis-a-vis someone's basic humanity is an outdated prejudice, and an infringement on a person's basic rights, as far as Enlightenment thinking is concerned. Particularism and its divisiveness—all too often the cause of contempt, hatred, fanaticism, and Wars—i