Some things are doomed to remain imperfect, the United Nations among them. De spite noble aspirations, the organization that more than any other embodies the collective will and wisdom of an imperfect world was created, in the words of one former secretary general, not to take humanity to heaven, but to save it from hell. Is it failing in that task? Alarmed at the bitter dispute over the war in Iraq, and at growing threats—from the devastation of AIDS and the danger of failing states to the prospect of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction—that the UN's founding powers hadn't even had night mares about, last year Kofi Annan, the current secretary-general, asked a group of eminent folk to put on their thinking caps. Their report on how the UN might in future better contribute to international peace and security—mobilising its own and the world's re sources to prevent crises where possible and to deal with them more resolutely and effectively where necessary—is due for delivery in two weeks' time. Yet the thoughtful debate such proposals deserve risks getting lost in the poisonous war of words between UN-baiters and UN-boosters, and in the fisticuffs over what governments seem to care about most: who will get any extra seats that may be up for grabs on the Security Council. The might-is-always-righter brigade, who brush aside the UN as irrelevant in today's world, are small in number but can seem troublingly influential. They are also dangerously shortsighted. Like other big powers, and plenty of smaller ones, America fosters the UN when it needs it, and sometimes circumvents it when it doesn't. But wiser heads recognize that being the world's most powerful country and top gun has its problems. With global interests and global reach, America is most often called on to right the world's wrongs. It should have been interest in a rules-based system which keeps that burden to a minimum and finds ways for others, including the UN, to share it. What is more, as China, India, Japan and others put on economic and military muscle, having agreed rules for all to play by as much as possible makes strategic sense too. Yet the not-without-UN-approval school can be equally off the mark. For the system of international rules, treaties and laws is still a hodge-podge. Some, like the UN charter itself, are deemed universal, though they may at time be hotly disputed and sometimes ignored. Others, such as the prohibitions against proliferation of nuclear, chemical or bio logical weapons, are accepted by many, but not all. Some disputes can be settled in court—boundary disputes by the International Court of Justice, for example, accusations of war crimes or genocide by the International Criminal Court—but only where governments give the nod. For the rest, the UN Security Council is where most serious disputes end up. And there trouble can start. The council is not the moral conscience of the world. It is a collection of states pursuing divergent interests, albeit—one hopes—with a sense of responsibility. Where it can agree, consensus lends legitimacy to action. But should action always stop where consensus ends? There was nothing high-minded about Russia's refusal to countenance intervention in Kosovo in 1999 to end the Serb army's ethnic cleansing there it was simply protecting a friend. Might, concluded NATO governments in acting without council approval, is not always wrong. Over Iraq, it is debatable what did more damage: America's failure to win support from the council before going to war anyway, or the hypocrisy that had allowed Iraq to flout all previous council resolutions with impunity. It can be inferred from the second paragraph that